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TURNING OVER A NEW SPROUT: PROMOTING 
AGRICULTURAL HEALTH BY FOSTERING THE 
COEXISTENCE OF ORGANIC AND GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED CROPS IN THE WAKE OF MONSANTO CO. V. 
GEERTSON SEED FARMS AND THE DEREGULATION OF 
MODIFIED ALFALFA 
ABSTRACT 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
agricultural health of the United States requires the concurrent feasibility, or 
coexistence, of organic crops and genetically modified crops. Both types of 
crops offer separate environmental, economic, and health benefits. Modified 
crops, or crops infused with beneficial genes to increase yield or decrease the 
need for chemical applications, are ubiquitous in U.S. farming. Similarly, 
organic crops, or crops grown without modified genes, are gaining popularity. 
Unfortunately, the coexistence of organic and modified crops is threatened by 
the phenomenon of gene flow. Damaging gene flow occurs when modified 
crops spread their genes and contaminate the genes of nonmodified crops. This 
contamination threatens the organic status and marketability of organic crops 
and can thus cause economic damage to organic programs. The current legal 
and regulatory system is unable to control contamination and thus cannot 
ensure the vitality of organic-farming operations. To fulfill coexistence goals 
for the agricultural health of the nation, domestic farm programs must ensure 
the continued viability of organic farming. 
The current regulatory system is unable to protect organic farms from the 
risks of contamination, and its inability deters and undermines organic 
farming. Recent deregulation decisions confirm this inability. Similarly, recent 
cases demonstrate that the technical litigation stemming from contamination 
confuses general courts and leads to inadequate remedies. This Comment 
argues that the regulatory and adjudicatory systems must protect organic 
farms from contamination to ensure their economic viability. When organic 
programs are economically viable, organic farms can beneficially coexist with 
modified-crop farms. 
This Comment offers two possible solutions to the current regimes’ 
inability to foster coexistence. The Comment contends that changes in agency 
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policy could better encompass the economic interests of organic programs and 
therefore encourage coexistence. However, limits on an agency’s ability to 
change policy hinder the efficacy of this solution. This Comment argues that a 
revised statutory framework is required to protect organic crops from the 
damaging genetic drift associated with widespread genetically modified crops. 
The revised framework requires the USDA to consider the economic impacts of 
contamination when deregulating modified crops. The revision also mandates 
agency adjudication for contamination disputes to prevent general courts from 
handing down inadequate remedies. The revisions will ensure the continued 
viability of organic farms, foster coexistence, and secure the agricultural 
health of the nation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States enjoys a rich tradition of agricultural prosperity. The 
country led the world in the development of genetically modified (GM) crops 
and continues to be a world leader in GM-food production.1 The domestic 
planting of GM crops grew at an unprecedented rate from 1996 through 2005.2 
Today, over 80% of the country’s corn, cotton, and soybeans contain 
genetically engineered genes.3 Modified crops offer benefits, such as increased 
yields, decreased labor costs, and decreased chemical applications.4 The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) advocates GM-crop research 
because the crops may help solve potential “issues related to global food 
security, energy security, and climate change.”5 
Like GM-crop farming, organic farming is a growing industry.6 Organic 
crops are crops grown without the aid of genetic alterations, pesticides, or 
herbicides.7 Organic crops tout benefits, such as the absence of food additives, 
the absence of pesticides and herbicides, and increased sustainability.8 Organic 
crops can also offer an absence of genetically altered elements and resistance 
to harm stemming from monocropping, or the widespread use of a single 
 
 1 See Linda Beebe, In re StarLink Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an 
Inadequate Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 511, 535 
(2004) (citing George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal 
Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 426–27 (2001)); Karinne Ludlow & 
Stuart J. Smyth, The Quandary of Agricultural Biotechnology, Pure Economic Loss, and Non-Adopters: 
Comparing Australia, Canada, and the United States, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 7, 35 (2011). 
 2 CLIVE JAMES, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, BRIEF 35: GLOBAL 
STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2006, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.isaaa.org/ 
resources/publications/briefs/35/download/isaaa-brief-35-2006.pdf. 
 3 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 
CROPS ON FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2010). 
 4 Id. at 3–14. 
 5 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2015, at 23 (2010), available at http://www.ocfo. 
usda.gov/usdasp/sp2010/sp2010.pdf. 
 6 Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and Environmental 
Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 14–15 (2011); Organic Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. 
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Organic/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2009). 
 7 See Margaret Rosso Grossman, The Coexistence of GM and Other Crops in the European Union, 16 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 324, 324 (2007); Sara N. Pasquinelli, One False Move: The History of Organic 
Agriculture and Consequences of Non-Compliance with the Governing Laws and Regulations, 3 GOLDEN 
GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 368 (2010) (discussing the historic definition of organic). 
 8 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 360–61 (citing Minou Yussefi, Organic Farming Worldwide 2006: 
Overview and Main Statistics, in THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS & EMERGING TRENDS 
2006, at 23, 23 (Helga Willer & Minou Yussefi eds., 2006)). 
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variety.9 The USDA suggests that farmers are changing to organic-crop 
production at an increasing rate to “lower input costs, conserve nonrenewable 
resources, capture high-value markets, and boost farm income.”10 
Because of possible risks associated with GM crops, the interest of organic-
farming operations in maintaining the organic status of their crops, and the 
desire to protect the overall stability of the agricultural sector, Congress has 
indicated its continued support for organic farming and the USDA has 
specifically announced its intention to foster coexistence between GM and 
organic crops.11 The USDA’s strategic plan and recent legislation emphasize 
the federal government’s desire to support organic programs. The USDA’s 
2010–2015 strategic plan notes that maintaining access to organic markets is a 
component of ensuring the financial stability of American farms.12 Indeed, the 
strategic plan seeks to increase the number of organic-farming operations by 
approximately 25% by the end of 2015.13 Similarly, the Organic Foods 
Production Act’s stated purpose is “to facilitate interstate commerce 
in . . . food that is organically produced.”14 The Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill) provides specific and ongoing incentives 
for farmers to engage in organic-crop production.15 These legislative 
statements and initiatives indicate a congressional desire to foster organic-crop 
programs alongside GM-crop programs. 
 
 9 See Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual-Property Rights and Agricultural Biodiversity, 3 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 124 (2009) (citing CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, 
POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 47 (1990)). 
 10 Organic Production: Documentation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers. 
usda.gov/data-products/organic-production/documentation.aspx (last updated July 5, 2012). 
 11 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack, Sec’y of Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Stakeholders (Dec. 2010), 
available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/GE_Alfalfa-to_stakeholders-2010Dec.pdf (“[W]e at the USDA 
are striving to lead an effort to forge a new paradigm based on coexistence and cooperation. If successful, this 
effort can ensure that all forms of agriculture thrive so that food can remain abundant, affordable, and safe.”). 
 12 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 5, at 9. 
 13 Id. at 10 (noting the baseline of 16,564 organic farms in 2009 and the target of 20,655 organic farms in 
2015). 
 14 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI, § 2102(3), 104 Stat. 3935, 3935 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6501(3) (2006)). 
 15 The 2008 Farm Bill created incentives within the Environmental Quality Incentives Program for 
famers to assist producers in changing to conservation-based organic-production practices. Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (codified in scattered sections of 7 
U.S.C.). The 2008 Farm Bill further charges the Secretary of Agriculture to develop “programs that meet 
specific needs of producers involved with organic” crop production. Id. sec. 2706, § 1242(i)(2)(B)(i), 122 Stat. 
at 1077. The 2008 Farm Bill also increases funding to the National Organic Program for each year through 
2012. See id. sec. 10303, § 2123(b), 122 Stat. at 1347. 
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Unfortunately, there are barriers to the successful coexistence of organic 
and GM crops. Gene flow, or the spread of genetic materials across plant 
populations, can contaminate organic crops, causing them to absorb GM genes 
and lose their organic status.16 This loss of status can cause considerable 
economic harm to organic programs that may no longer be able to sell organic 
crops.17 Contamination occurs when genetic data is spread from one crop to 
another by various means, including wind, insect activity, or human 
intervention.18 Contamination of organic crops through gene flow is the 
primary obstacle to the successful coexistence of GM and organic crops. 
There is no legal framework directly addressing contamination resulting 
from gene flow. Responding to the USDA’s promotion of coexistence 
strategies to promote agricultural health, the American Farm Bureau 
Association implicitly stated that the current legal and regulatory systems are 
unable to prevent contamination and foster beneficial coexistence.19 The 
existing federal system governing the deregulation of GM crops spreads 
responsibility across the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the USDA.20 This framework presumes 
that GM crops are beneficial.21 The USDA, through the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), holds the most power over possible 
contamination through its responsibility to regulate GM crops as pests under 
the Plant Protection Act.22 However, APHIS’s statutory directives only require 
it to rely on “sound science” in decisions concerning agricultural products.23 
The agency routinely grants deregulation permits based on general 
 
 16 See Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations in the Crop, Forestry, Animal and Fishery Sectors, 
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/biotech/C7doc.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) 
[hereinafter Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations]. 
 17 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 
27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 593, 623 (2003). 
 18 See Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations, supra note 16. 
 19 Letter from Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n et al. to John P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, 
Exec. Office of the President (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://www.naturalnews.com/files/GMO_science_ 
letter.pdf. 
 20 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26, 
1986) (laying out agency responsibility).  
 21 The language of the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Coordinated 
Framework) promoted biotechnology and noted that GM crops were not expected to pose any new risks. Id. at 
23,339. 
 22 Pub. L. No. 106-224, tit. IV, 114 Stat. 438 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 
(2006)); 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.1 (2011). 
 23 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7754. 
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extrapolations from field tests and without fully considering genetic drift.24 
Further, APHIS presumes GM crops are substantially equivalent to non-GM 
crops.25 Thus, APHIS, and therefore the overall regulatory system, does not 
protect organic-farm systems from contamination and does not support the 
USDA’s goals of coexistence. 
The courts are similarly unable to adequately protect coexistence ideals. 
Frequent technical litigation in the form of patent infringement suits, tort suits, 
or regulatory challenges confuses general courts and leads to unsatisfying 
remedies. The USDA has noted that conflict between GM and non-GM crops, 
like organic crops, may lead to frequent litigation where the courts ultimately 
decide “who gets to farm.”26 GM alfalfa was among the crops regulated by 
APHIS when Monsanto petitioned for deregulation stating that its GM alfalfa 
should not be considered a pest risk.27 APHIS granted Monsanto’s petition in 
full and allowed partial deregulation,28 and then Geertson Seed Farms and 
other organic groups brought suit against the USDA. The ensuing litigation, 
which reached the Supreme Court, ultimately led to the deregulation of 
alfalfa.29 More recently, APHIS chose to deregulate GM sugar beets in 
violation of a court order requiring the agency to undertake further 
environmental assessment.30 These deregulations demonstrate that the courts 
are unable to foster coexistence. 
The recent disputes over the deregulation and subsequent planting of GM 
alfalfa and GM sugar beets have highlighted the growing conflict between GM 
and organic crops. Organic producers argued that the deregulated crops would 
harm their interests in maintaining organic farms, but GM producers had 
satisfied the regulatory requirements for deregulation.31 Both groups have 
legitimate claims, and the problems for coexistence reside in the legal and 
regulatory framework governing the farming practices. 
 
 24 Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically Modified 
Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 412 (2007). 
 25 See id. 
 26 Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11. 
 27 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010). 
 28 See Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability Determination of Nonregulated 
Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,917, 
36,917–19 (June 27, 2005) (granting deregulation). 
 29 Andrew Pollack, U.S. Approves Genetically Modified Alfalfa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at B1. 
 30 Andrew Pollack, U.S. Says Farmers May Grow Engineered Sugar Beets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011, at 
B3. 
 31 Pollack, supra note 29; Pollack, supra note 30. 
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This Comment seeks to explore the current regulatory and legal structures 
governing GM crops and contamination, and demonstrate how the system does 
not foster the coexistence of GM and organic crops. Part I discusses the growth 
of organic- and GM-farming practices. Part I also illustrates how 
contamination conflicts with the goal of coexistence. Part II explains the 
current legal issues relating to coexistence. The discussion emphasizes the role 
of the existing regulatory framework, particularly APHIS’s role under the Plant 
Protection Act. Part II also illustrates the failures of the current legal and 
regulatory regime in controlling contamination and protecting the economic 
feasibility of organic farming. Part III explores two court decisions: Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms and a recent case applying Monsanto, Center for 
Food Safety v. Vilsack. These cases highlight the weaknesses in the federal 
regulatory program and the inability of the courts to provide adequate 
remedies. Part IV proposes possible solutions to protect the economic viability 
of organic programs and therefore foster coexistence. Part IV also addresses 
the feasibility and costs of the proposed solutions. 
I. GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS AND ORGANIC CROPS 
The current regulatory system is unable to ensure the beneficial coexistence 
of GM and organic crops. Similarly, the courts are unable to support 
coexistence. It is necessary to understand the benefits of both organic crops 
and GM crops, and the problems of contamination, before exploring the 
failures in the legal framework. This Part introduces (1) GM-crop farming, (2) 
organic-crop farming, (3) the goal of coexistence, and (4) the obstacle of 
genetic contamination in achieving coexistence. 
A. Genetically-Modified-Crop Farming in U.S. Agriculture 
GM crops emerged in U.S. farming in 199632 and were quickly adopted 
throughout the agricultural sector.33 Engineered crops are typically infused 
either with herbicide-resistant genes, pest-resistant genes, or both.34 Farmers 
have embraced herbicide-resistant GM soybean and cotton to the greatest 
 
 32 Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERVICE, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ (last updated July 12, 2012). 
 33 See JAMES, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the period from 1996–2005 had “unprecedented” adoption 
rates of biotech crops by U.S. farmers). 
 34 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 3, at 30. Some crops are also infused 
with virus-resistant genes. Id. at 29–30. 
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extent but have also extensively planted GM cotton and corn.35 In 2009, based 
on acreage, more than 80% of the corn, cotton, and soybeans grown in the 
United States contained genetically engineered genes.36 The United States 
produces approximately half of the world’s biotech crops.37 
This widespread adoption of GM crops (extending well beyond cotton, 
soybeans, and corn) has led to undisputed benefits, such as increased yields, 
decreased labor in weed and pest management, and decreased chemical 
applications.38 Additionally, GM crops offer environmental benefits in the 
form of reduced greenhouse gases.39 GM crops also have the potential to 
produce pharmaceutical materials.40 
The United States has largely encouraged the domestic production and 
planting of GM crops. To incentivize the development of GM crops, the 
United States extends patent protection to modified crops.41 GM producers 
develop and sell seeds that sprout engineered crops.42 The patents on these 
seeds trump farmers’ common law rights to replant seeds from a prior 
harvest.43 These patents have led to tremendous growth in the United States’ 
GM-crop industry44 and helped the United States become a world leader in the 
production of GM crops.45 The USDA continues to advocate GM-crop 
research, noting that the technology also “address[es] issues related to global 
food security, energy security, and climate change.”46 
 
 35 Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S., supra note 32. 
 36 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 3, at 1. 
 37 Alison Peck, Leveling the Playing Field in GMO Risk Assessment: Importers, Exporters and the Limits 
of Science, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 241, 265 (2010). 
 38 See Andrew Pollack, Study Finds Benefits in Genetically Modified Crops but Warns of Overuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at B3. 
 39 See Drew L. Kershen, Sustainable Intensive Agriculture: High Technology and Environmental 
Benefits, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 424, 429 (2007) (summarizing and citing numerous studies establishing 
environmental benefits from biotech farming). 
 40 Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming F(ears) of Corn: Public Health and Biopharming, 30 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 371, 372 (2004). 
 41 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 89; Benjamin Ikuta, Genetically Modified Plants, Patents, and Terminator 
Technology: The Destruction of the Tradition of Seed Saving, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 731, 739 (2009); see also 
discussion infra Part II.A. 
 42 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 739. 
 43 See id. at 739–40 (discussing the reduction in a farmer’s common law right to save seeds). 
 44 See id. (noting that use of herbicide-resistant soybeans rose from 17% of total soybean acreage to over 
70% from 1997 to 2006). 
 45 See Peck, supra note 37, at 244–45 (noting the United States’ prominent position in producing and 
exporting GM organisms). 
 46 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 5, at 23. 
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Despite the benefits of GM crops, they have not been unanimously 
adopted. A small number of countries in the European Union have adopted 
certain GM crops, but the approval process for such adoption is notably 
“laborious.”47 Recent studies in the United States indicate that the benefits of 
GM crops may come with significant drawbacks, especially in the form of 
herbicide-resistant weeds.48 Additionally, excessive monocropping of GM 
crops can lead to potential drawbacks.49 Monocropping, or monoculture, 
describes the homogenous planting of a single genetic strain of a crop.50 A 
widespread homogenous crop is more susceptible to disease, weeds, and pests 
because a single virus or infection capable of hurting the particular strain can 
damage the entire crop.51 Diversity within a type of crop prevents a single 
epidemic from destroying an entire harvest.52  
B. Organic-Crop Farming in U.S. Agriculture 
The establishment of GM crops has coincided with the growth of organic-
farming practices in the United States.53 In 2006, over 623,000 farms in the 
United States grew organic crops.54 The organic-product industry is predicted 
to generate over $50 billion in revenues in 2025 and expected to continue to 
grow at a rate of 18% to 20% annually.55 The growing popularity of organic 
food in the United States is exemplified by First Lady Michelle Obama’s 
organic garden on the White House lawn.56 
 
 47 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, In the Fields of Italy, a Conflict over Corn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at A4 
(noting that there are only two GM crops that have gained approval throughout Europe). There is also 
controversy in developing countries where leaders refuse to adopt GM crops despite widespread hunger in 
their nations. See, e.g., Famine and the GM Debate, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2002, 9:58 AM), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/2459903.stm. 
 48 See Andrew Pollack, Monsanto’s Fortunes Turn Sour, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1 (noting the 
emergence of Roundup-resistance genes after wide use of the herbicide). 
 49 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 124 (“Genetic engineering in the context of commercial crops necessarily 
entails decreased genetic diversity. Because it is essential that GE crops have a uniform genetic structure, 
genetic engineering encourages monoculture.”). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (citing FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 9, at 47). 
 52 Id. (citing FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 9, at 46–47). 
 53 See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Is a Food Revolution Now in Season?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU1. 
 54 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 360–61 (citing Yussefi, supra note 8, at 23). 
 55 Pasquinelli, supra note 7, at 366. 
 56 Martin, supra note 53; see also Marian Burros, Obamas to Plant Vegetable Garden at White House, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A1. 
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Organic products are generally defined as products derived from crops 
grown without the aid of pesticides, herbicides, or genetic modifications.57 
Although the USDA defines organic food for domestic-labeling purposes, its 
definition is not as strict, in terms of permissible levels of chemicals or 
modified genes, as in other organic markets, particularly international 
markets.58 Among the benefits attributed to organic products is the absence of 
genetically altered elements and reduced environmental harm incurred from 
broad pesticide application.59 Organic varieties also entail increased diversity 
to prevent the risks associated with monocropping.60 As noted, the USDA 
believes farmers change to organic-crop production “to lower input costs, 
conserve nonrenewable resources, capture high-value markets, and boost farm 
income.”61 
C. The Beneficial Coexistence of Modified and Organic Crops 
The benefits associated with both GM crops and organic crops demonstrate 
that the agricultural health of the United States requires coexistence between 
the two practices.62 The Secretary of Agriculture recognized this benefit and 
announced the USDA’s intention to foster coexistence in December 2010.63 
Similarly, the 2008 Farm Bill included provisions indicating a congressional 
desire to ensure continued organic farming in the United States.64 Excessive 
GM farming is susceptible to the risks of monocropping. Organic farming is 
not susceptible to the risks of monocropping but does not entail the increased 
yields or harm resistance of GM crops. Thus, American farming will benefit 
from enhanced food security resulting from successful coexistence.65 
Unfortunately, coexistence is difficult because genetic drift can cause GM 
 
 57 See Grossman, supra note 7, at 324; Pasquinelli, supra note 7, at 368 (discussing the historic definition 
of organic and the origins of the modern organic-agriculture movement). 
 58 See William S. Eubanks II, The Sustainable Farm Bill: A Proposal for Permanent Environmental 
Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10493, 10507–08 (2009). 
 59 See Martin, supra note 53. 
 60 Aoki, supra note 9, at 124. 
 61 U.S. Organic Farming, supra note 10. 
 62 See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, the Common Law of Biotechnology and Economic 
Liability Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 115, 118–19 (2008) (discussing the benefits of coexistence). 
 63 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11. 
 64 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 65 See Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food, Farming, 
and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 935, 963 (2010) (noting that the historical aims 
of food security are fading to special interests). 
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crops to contaminate organic crops.66 When organic crops are contaminated, 
the crops can lose organic status in their desired market, causing substantial 
economic losses to the organic crop producers.67 
D. Contamination and Its Frustration of Coexistence 
Gene flow, or the spread of genetic materials across plant populations, can 
contaminate organic crops by causing them to absorb GM genes and lose their 
organic status.68 This loss of status can cause considerable economic harm to 
organic programs.69 Contamination results from genetic exposure through 
cross-pollination, unclean harvesting or storage practices, or improper handling 
outside the farm.70 While the USDA often mandates defined boundaries to 
prevent cross-pollination,71 such boundaries do not prevent contamination 
either because of illegal plantings or insufficient boundary distances.72 
Although some contamination is inevitable,73 the current legal structure is 
unable to establish a program that can consistently control contamination and 
support coexistence.74 Successful coexistence requires the ongoing economic 
feasibility of organic crops, and contamination threatens such feasibility. 
Coexistence troubles were before the USDA when, in 2004, it granted 
deregulation and then litigated its decision to the Supreme Court.75 The USDA 
has now deregulated GM alfalfa despite continuing protests of its potential to 
contaminate.76 The ultimate deregulation of GM alfalfa77 is indicative of the 
weaknesses of the current framework in fostering coexistence. 
 
 66 Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for GMO Accountability, 21 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 38 (2008). 
 67 Stephanie M. Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting: Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property 
Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9 (2005). Farmers are unable to insure 
themselves against the risk of genetic drift. See Roger A. McEowen, Legal Issues Related to the Use and 
Ownership of Genetically Modified Organisms, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 620–21 (2004). 
 68 See Gene Flow from GM to Non-GM Populations, supra note 16. 
 69 Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 9. 
 70 Peck, supra note 66, at 43. 
 71 See 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c) (2011) (imposing crop-distance boundaries upon deregulation). 
 72 Peck, supra note 66, at 47. 
 73 Id. at 45. 
 74 See Schneider, supra note 65, at 958 (“[T]he contamination of non-genetically engineered crops 
through cross pollination represents a significant problem that remains unresolved.”). 
 75 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010) (discussing APHIS’s decision to 
deregulate alfalfa). 
 76 See Pollack, supra note 29. 
 77 Id. 
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II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND ITS FAILURES 
The current legal structure governing coexistence efforts includes (1) patent 
protections for GM crops; (2) state and local legal remedies, including tort 
suits, aiding those harmed by contamination; and (3) a regulatory framework 
governing the release, or deregulation, of GM crops. GM-crop producers can 
obtain patents for their products under the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the Plant 
Variety Protection Act of 1970, and other utility-patent provisions.78 Producers 
of patented seed varieties may enforce these patents even in situations where 
alleged infringers obtained the patented genes via genetic drift.79 Conversely, 
farmers have brought suit against GM-crop growers under various tort theories 
for damage caused by genetic drift.80 The litigation stemming from 
contamination (including patent and tort suits) imposes unnecessary costs on 
U.S. agriculture and may deter organic farming. The Secretary of Agriculture 
identified consistent litigation as a hurdle for coexistence.81 He has called for a 
“better way” to promote coexistence than through the courts.82 
Outside the courts, the release of GM crops is governed by the patchwork 
regulatory system established by the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology (Coordinated Framework).83 While patent protections for GM 
crops and tort protection for organic farmers offer some protection and relief, 
the failures of the regulatory system prevent the beneficial coexistence of GM 
crops and organic crops. Specifically, the Coordinated Framework is unable to 
satisfactorily account for the risk of contamination under its statutory 
directives. This part discusses (1) GM-crop patent protection, (2) tort and local 
remedies, and (3) the Coordinated Framework. 
A. Patent Protection for Genetically Modified Crops 
A series of patent acts and Supreme Court cases provides incentives for 
GM producers to develop GM crops.84 The Plant Patent Act of 1930 granted 
patents to the developers of asexually reproducing plants.85 As private-brand 
 
 78 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 734–39 (discussing the development of patent protections for GM crops). 
 79 See Drew L. Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 578 (2003) 
(reviewing bases of potential infringement claims). 
 80 See McEowen, supra note 67, at 618–25 (reviewing potential tort claims). 
 81 Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11. 
 82 Id. 
 83  51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986). 
 84 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 734–39. 
 85 Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006)). 
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seeds continued to gain market share, Congress passed the 1970 Plant Variety 
Protection Act86 (PVPA), extending patent protection to most commercial 
crops.87 These legislative protections, combined with Supreme Court decisions 
favoring biotechnology research,88 led to the consolidation of large seed 
companies, particularly Monsanto and DuPont.89 Monsanto recently acquired 
“terminator technology” to ensure that farmers who buy GM seeds can only 
use those seeds for a single harvest.90 
These patent protections are incapable of fully resolving the issue of 
genetic drift from modified crops to organic crops.91 While GM producers risk 
losing patented products to noncustomer farmers, traditional farmers risk 
liability when patented-crop genes drift onto their farms.92 Indeed, as of 2005, 
Monsanto had filed over one hundred infringement suits against noncustomer 
farmers.93 By 2010, the company won fifty-seven judgments and recovered 
over $20 million from patent suits.94 It frequently wins its patent infringement 
claims.95 While Monsanto offers to remove patented seeds upon notification by 
the affected farmer, organic farms risk losing crops in the removal process.96 
Additionally, organic operations may be unaware of contamination until crops 
are harvested.97 Recent cases demonstrate that non-GM farmers can be liable 
 
 86 Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582). 
 87 Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, Trade, and the 
Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 165 (2005). 
 88 See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (extending utility 
patents to modified seeds and holding that the Plant Patent Act and PVPA cannot limit utility patents); 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (interpreting the Plant Patent Act and PVPA broadly, and 
allowing patents to be issued based on human effort); see also Stein, supra note 87, at 166–68 (describing 
Supreme Court cases as encouraging the development of the agribusiness industry). 
 89 Stein, supra note 87, at 164, 167. “[T]he Justice Department is investigating Monsanto for possible 
antitrust violations.” Pollack, supra note 48. 
 90 See Ikuta, supra note 41, at 739. The “terminator technology” and the extension of utility-patent 
protection to modified seeds effectively eliminate the common law right of farmers to replant seeds purchased 
in a prior season. Id. 
 91 See Kershen, supra note 79, at 601 (proposing applying the law of stray animals to fix problems with 
patent rights and genetic drift). 
 92 Id. at 578. 
 93 Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 8. 
 94 Amanda L. Kool, Halting Pig in the Parlor Patents: Nuisance Law as a Tool to Redress Crop 
Contamination, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 453, 468 (2010). 
 95 See Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 83, 102 (2006). 
 96 See Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 9 (noting the risk of removal). 
 97 See id. at 8 (explaining that an organic farmer may have to spray pesticide to determine if a potentially 
contaminated crop is resistant to the pesticide). 
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for the inadvertent presence of GM seeds in their crops, even when 
neighboring farms utilize the patented crops.98 
The threat of liability from infringement suits or lost profits from crop 
removals may be enough to deter farmers from growing organically.99 
Similarly, GM producers must invest resources in monitoring and enforcing 
their patents.100 Neither GM producers nor organic farmers benefit from 
lawsuits stemming from the patent framework. The patent system and the 
ensuing litigation, often stemming from inadvertent contamination, impose 
costs on both GM producers and organic-farming interests, and frustrate 
coexistence. 
B. State and Local Efforts to Promote Coexistence 
State and local efforts at controlling contamination, including tort suits 
from non-GM farmers, offer some support to coexistence aims. Organic-
farming interests can seek relief when their interests are injured by 
contamination under the traditional tort theories of trespass, nuisance, or 
negligence.101 While tort suits on behalf of organic programs may earn them 
some relief, these options are insufficient to protect the goals of coexistence in 
U.S. farming. Generally, farmers cannot recover under tort law for purely 
economic loss.102 Similarly, organic farmers may not be able to prove damages 
when contaminated crops still meet the USDA definition of organic, despite 
stricter definitions in foreign markets.103 Also, organic farmers bringing suit 
for loss from contamination face countersuits for patent infringement.104 
Farmers who bring specific tort actions face problems in establishing causality 
or a duty of care.105 Additionally, local efforts at protecting organic-farming 
 
 98 See, e.g., Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.) (imposing liability on a farmer 
when five neighboring farmers grew Monsanto GM canola and 40% of Canadian farmers used Monsanto 
canola). 
 99 Pasquinelli, supra note 7, at 380. 
 100 See Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 8 (noting that Monsanto has filed over one hundred suits in the United 
States for patent infringement). 
 101 See McEowen, supra note 67, at 618–25 (discussing potential tort actions for non-GM farmers). 
Farmers have been wholly unsuccessful in seeking damages under strict liability theories. Id. at 626. 
 102 See id. at 622. 
 103 See Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food Regulations, 13 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 429 (2005) (discussing labeling and noting that USDA-organic status tolerates the 
presence of some modified genes). 
 104 McEowen, supra note 67, at 620. 
 105 Id. at 618–25. 
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practices may be frustrated by state and federal preemption.106 This section 
discusses (1) trespass, (2) nuisance, (3) negligence, and (4) state and local 
legislation regarding coexistence. 
1. Trespass 
Organic-farming interests can sue under trespass alleging that drifting 
modified genes interfere with their ownership of land.107 Trespass is an 
unauthorized intrusion on a person’s land that interferes with that person’s 
ownership of the land.108 Organic farmers tend to seek negligent trespass 
because intentional trespass is difficult to prove in the context of 
contamination, which may occur without intentional human interference.109 
Farmers able to prove invasion face countersuits in terms of patent 
infringements.110 Nevertheless, trespass is probably the most promising tort 
action available to those injured by genetic drift. 
2. Nuisance 
Organic programs can also allege that drifting modified genes interfere 
with the reasonable use of their land.111 A nuisance, specifically a private 
nuisance, “is an invasion of an individual’s interest in the reasonable use and 
enjoyment of . . . her land.”112 Proving that genetic drift is a nuisance requires 
proving that the planting of nearby GM crops was unreasonable.113 Because of 
the widespread use of GM crops and the federal imprimatur of GM planting 
(assuming deregulation), organic programs may have difficulty proving that 
the planting of GM crops was unreasonable.114 Further, the widespread use of 
GM crops would make identifying the culprit of unreasonable behavior nearly 
impossible.115 Additionally, many state right-to-farm laws prevent nuisance 
 
 106 See A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies in a Biotech World: Exploring Statutory Grower 
Protections, 13 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 206, 215, 230 (2006). 
 107 McEowen, supra note 67, at 618. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 619. 
 110 See id. at 620 (noting the risks of countersuits). 
 111 See id. at 623. 
 112 See id. at 623–24. 
 113 Id. at 624. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See Friedland, supra note 103, at 428 n.227. 
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suits against neighboring farms.116 Nevertheless, contamination of non-GM 
crops has formed the basis for nuisance suits against GM growers.117 
3. Negligence 
To prove negligence, organic programs must establish that a GM producer 
or grower breached a duty of care in allowing genetic drift from GM crops.118 
There is not a uniform standard for the duty of care owed by GM-crop farmers, 
but negligence-based suits have had some success.119 The StarLink litigation, 
discussed below, included negligence claims.120 Negligence suits, however, 
like most tort causes of action, require injured farmers to prove more than just 
economic damage.121 Organic programs have been unable to recover under 
negligence for purely economic loss without evidence of physical damage.122 
Although organic interests may be able to recover for damages incurred 
from gene transmission through trespass or nuisance, the theories provide 
after-the-fact remedies to crop contamination at best and do not seem to offer 
ex ante deterrence to GM growers. Many organic farmers will be suing their 
nonorganic neighbors, who have contracted with GM producers and may not 
have the assets to make the injured organic farmer whole.123 Farmers injured 
by drift may also have trouble proving damages when their products can still 
be labeled organic under domestic standards.124 While negligence suits have 
had some success in this arena, they will not be truly valuable until federal law 
defines a uniform standard of care.125 Further, adequate federal enforcement of 
buffer zones between different crops should prevent tort contamination 
claims.126 Organic organizations chose not to rely on ex post tort suits in the 
 
 116 Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go 
Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 87–88 (2006). 
 117 Mandel, supra note 95, at 100. 
 118 See McEowen, supra note 67, at 621. 
 119 Id. at 622. 
 120 Id. at 622 n.61. 
 121 Id. at 622. 
 122 Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Litigating the Economic Impacts of Biotech Crops, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2008, at 24, 27. 
 123 See Friedland, supra note 103, at 428. 
 124 Id. at 429. 
 125 McEowen, supra note 67, at 622. 
 126 See Bratspies, supra note 24, at 414; Emily Gersema, USDA Survey Shows Biotech Rules Breaches, 
IOWA ST. U. EXTENSION & OUTREACH (Sept. 10, 2003), http://www.extension.iastate.edu/Grain/Topics/ 
BiotechRulesBreaches.htm. 
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cases of Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms127 and Center for Food Safety 
v. Vilsack,128 where the organizations challenged deregulation decisions before 
incurring damage from genetic drift.129 
4. State and Local Efforts at Fostering Coexistence 
State and local regulatory efforts at fostering coexistence by controlling 
contamination have been largely unsuccessful. No state has passed laws 
shifting the loss incurred from contamination away from the injured farmer.130 
California, Idaho, and Washington impose legislatively enacted buffer zones 
for specific crops.131 Although these enactments penalize those who violate the 
buffer zones,132 the boundary distances, like those imposed by APHIS, are not 
necessarily effective. While many localities have taken steps to create 
“[g]rower[’s] [d]istricts” that prevent the growing of GM crops in certain 
areas, state laws tend to preempt the local efforts.133 State laws that preempt 
local laws tend to promote the planting of GM crops, rather than foster 
coexistence.134 Further, state laws are considerably weakened by state 
deference to the federal government’s scientific determinations.135 Finally, the 
Plant Protection Act, under which APHIS regulates GM crops, preempts any 
inconsistent or excessive state regulations.136 Because of the weakness of state 
and local regulations relative to federal regulations, state and local actions are 
unable to protect the economic feasibility of organic programs and therefore 
are unable to foster the goals of coexistence. 
C. The Existing Regulatory Framework 
There is no regulatory framework directly aimed at fostering coexistence. 
The relevant regulatory framework addressing coexistence lies in the 
Coordinated Framework created by the Reagan Administration when 
 
 127 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 128 734 F. Supp. 2d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 129 Monsanto Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2749; Ctr. for Food Safety, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
 130 Peck, supra note 66 at 64. 
 131 See Endres, supra note 106, at 215–17. 
 132 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 52971–52976 (West 2001 & Supp. 2012); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 
r. 02.06.13.200 (2011); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 16-302-055(8) (2012). 
 133 Endres, supra note 106, at 215. 
 134 See id. at 219 (noting that many of the state laws that preempt local planting restrictions are 
implemented to encourage biotech crops). 
 135 Id. at 230. 
 136 Id. at 231. 
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engineered crops were first conceived.137 The system, chartered to control the 
introduction of GM crops, was devised with a pro-industry,138 pro-GM crop 
aim.139 The program’s charter emphasized that GM crops are generally 
equivalent to non-GM crops.140 This framework is unable to address the 
environmental concerns of the introduction of GM crops and has no 
mechanism to deal with economic harm incurred by neighboring farms.141 
The Coordinated Framework vested power over the introduction of GM 
crops in (1) the FDA, (2) the EPA, and (3) the USDA (with the Secretary of 
Agriculture delegating authority to APHIS).142 The framework awkwardly 
delineated limited power to each agency, almost inevitably leading to an 
incomplete system of protection.143 None of the three agencies have a clear 
mandate to regulate GM crops.144 This section discusses the Coordinated 
Framework by analyzing (1) the responsibility granted to the FDA, (2) the 
responsibility granted to the EPA, (3) the responsibility granted to APHIS, (4) 
the limitations imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act, and (5) the 
failures of the current framework. 
1. The Food and Drug Administration 
Under the Coordinated Framework, the FDA exerts authority under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and is charged with 
controlling adulterated foods in the United States food supply.145 Adulterated 
 
 137 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,302–09 (June 26, 
1986). 
 138 Peck, supra note 66, at 49. 
 139 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302–06 (noting that 
GM crops will not pose new threats to humans or the environment). 
 140 Peck, supra note 37, at 251. 
 141 See Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2243 (2004) (calling the 
deregulation process insufficient). 
 142 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,304; see also 
Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 311–12 (2002) (outlining the Coordinated Framework and subsequent delegation). 
The Coordinated Framework also gave tangential power to the National Institutes of Health and Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 
23,304, 23,306. 
 143 Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically Engineered Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments in the EPA’s 
Regulation of Biotechnology, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257, 269–84 (1996); Bratspies, supra note 142, at 
310–12. 
 144 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 404. 
 145 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, ch. 675, § 402, 52 Stat. 1040, 1046–47 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2006)) (outlining FDA responsibilities). 
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foods include any food that may contain a “deleterious substance which may 
render it injurious to health.”146 With power over adulterated foods, the FDA 
could assert considerable sway over the introduction of engineered crops.147 
The FDA considers GM foods “substantially similar” to conventional foods.148 
This equivalence principle allows the FDA to presume that many GM-food 
products are “generally regarded as safe.”149 One commentator suggested that 
the FDA may have relied on the substantial-equivalence principle as “a 
convenient vehicle for avoiding its statutory responsibilities under the 
FDCA.”150 Relying on this presumptive safe classification, the FDA has 
declined to impose labeling requirements on GM-food products.151 This 
decision hampers the ability of the Coordinated Framework to foster 
coexistence.152 In an unequal duality, organic foods face strict labeling 
requirements in the United States.153 In essence, the presumption today is that 
most foods contain GM ingredients. Coexistence principles would be better 
served by approval and labeling programs that balance incentives between 
organic farming and GM farming. 
2. The Environmental Protection Agency 
Under the Coordinated Framework, the EPA’s influence over GM crops, 
like the FDA’s, is limited. The EPA’s limited influence is due to its narrow 
interpretation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
 
 146 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1). 
 147 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 408. The FDA’s power is necessarily limited because it is only able to 
regulate products that reach the food (or drug) supply. Bratspies, supra note 142, at 312. However, one would 
think that an FDA indication that a food product would not be marketable would dissuade a producer from 
planting the crops. 
 148 Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 442 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from 
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,985 (May 29, 1992)). This policy was challenged by groups and 
individuals seeking stronger scrutiny over GM foods by the FDA. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. 
Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that 
the FDA’s policy choice was not an arbitrary-and-capricious agency decision. Id. at 181. 
 149 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150 McGarity, supra note 148, at 442. 
 151 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 408. There have been several legislative initiatives since 2000 to extend the 
FDA’s oversight of GM crops, but they all died in committee. Id. at 410. 
 152 See Peck, supra note 37, at 254 (claiming that the FDA policy favors biotech products over the vitality 
of non-GM products). 
 153 See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI, § 2107, 104 Stat. 3935, 
3938 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6506 (2006)). 
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(FIFRA).154 This power is confined to controlling the amount of pesticides in 
U.S. food products. The EPA interprets the statute as allowing “no regulatory 
authority over plants that do not produce pesticides.”155 While many GM crops 
produce pesticides and are required to be registered before they can be sold, 
the EPA issues permits based on a minimal tolerance level and frequently 
grants exemptions to GM producers.156 Under the current regime, the EPA 
generally forgoes a meaningful role in protecting organic farms from 
contamination.157 The EPA’s permissive approach limits the protection the 
Coordinated Framework provides to organic crops and, therefore, frustrates 
coexistence goals. 
3. The United States Department of Agriculture and the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service 
The Coordinated Framework gave authority to the USDA to control the 
introduction of GM crops into domestic farms but specifically noted that GM 
crops should generally be deemed an improvement.158 The USDA’s authority 
is derived from the implementing regulations of the Plant Protection Act,159 
which calls for regulation of plants “altered or produced through genetic 
engineering that are plant pests.”160 APHIS is an agency within the USDA 
charged with executing the USDA’s responsibilities under the Plant Protection 
Act.161 Because plant pests are defined as any organism capable of injuring or 
causing disease to any other plant, APHIS’s promulgated regulations presume 
that genetically engineered plants are regulated as plant pests.162 GM crops are 
considered pest risks in part because of their potential to contaminate non-GM 
crops through genetic drift.163 
 
 154 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,304, 23,306 
(June 26, 1986) (directing the EPA to assert regulatory power over GM plants); McGarity, supra note 148, at 
466–67 (arguing that the EPA could assert more authority under FIFRA). 
 155 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 411. 
 156 Id. at 410–11. 
 157 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 467, 469–72 (noting the extensive exemptions issued by the EPA 
under FIFRA). 
 158 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,339; see also Bratspies, 
supra note 24, at 411–12 (noting that the Coordinated Framework indicated that GM crops will not pose 
threats). 
 159 Pub. L. No. 106-224, tit. IV, 114 Stat. 438 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 
(2006)). 
 160 7 C.F.R. § 340(a)(2) n.1 (2011). 
 161 Id. §§ 2.80(a)(36), 340.1. 
 162 See id. §§ 340.0(a)(2), 340.1–.2, 340.6. 
 163 See Angelo, supra note 143, at 271. 
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Modified crops must be cleared by APHIS before they can be planted.164 
Pursuant to the Coordinated Framework, APHIS presumes that modified 
organisms are not unlike their nonmodified counterparts.165 Indeed, APHIS 
considers modified plants “substantially equivalent” to nonmodified plants of 
the same variety.166 APHIS has considerable discretion when considering 
deregulation because Congress only directs the agency to follow sound 
science.167 APHIS may grant a permit when the party seeking deregulation 
presents scientific information showing that the GM crop causes no more 
environmental harm than the nonmodified variety.168 Typically, APHIS will 
authorize a permit for the planting of a new GM crop after field tests 
demonstrate that the organism will not pose a pest risk to other plants.169 
APHIS does not necessarily fully deregulate a strain and may instead impose 
boundary distances between partially deregulated crops and non-GM crops.170 
Once permitted for planting or deregulated, a crop is no longer considered a 
pest and therefore is no longer subject to APHIS’s oversight.171 However, 
APHIS has a duty to monitor partially deregulated crops to ensure that 
boundary distances and handling instructions are adhered to.172 
4. The National Environmental Policy Act 
The Coordinated Framework is supplemented by the restrictions imposed 
on all agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).173 
 
 164 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.4. Any individual can request deregulated status. Id. § 340.6. 
 165 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412. 
 166 Id. The substantial-equivalence approach is at odds with the “precautionary regulatory approach,” 
which advocates restraint in the face of scientific uncertainty relating to a proposed course of action’s possible 
environmental damage. Bratspies, supra note 142, at 317–18. 
 167 7 U.S.C. § 7711(b) (2006). Producers may petition APHIS for deregulation pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 
§ 340.6, and APHIS is entitled to deny the petition, grant the petition, or grant the petition in part. Id. 
§ 340.6(d)(3). 
 168 Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION 
SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/submissions.shtml (last modified Feb. 17, 2012). 
 169 See Angelo, supra note 143, at 271 (describing field-testing procedures). 
 170 Biotechnology Regulatory Service, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION 
SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/brs_main.shtml (last modified Apr. 3, 2012); Permits, 
Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168; Regulatory Operations Programs: Compliance and Inspections, 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 
biotechnology/compliance_main.shtml (last modified Apr. 11, 2012). 
 171 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412; Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168. 
 172 Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168; Regulatory Operations Programs: Compliance 
and Inspections, supra note 170. 
 173 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2010)). 
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NEPA imposes environmental-consideration requirements on agencies 
deregulating GM crops.174 NEPA requires all agencies, before taking any 
major action, to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed action.175 
NEPA charges agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
before any major federal action.176 The EIS must include a detailed account of 
the environmental impacts of the action, the adverse environmental impacts 
that cannot be avoided, and any possible alternatives to the action.177 An 
agency can, however, avoid issuing an EIS if it determines through an 
Environmental Assessment (EA) that there will be no significant 
environmental impact relating to the agency action.178 Agency determinations 
under NEPA are subject to judicial review.179 While APHIS plays a major role 
in the deregulation of modified crops (indeed, a more significant role than 
either the FDA or the EPA), NEPA remains a check on the environmental 
impacts of APHIS actions because APHIS will have to justify a decision on an 
action under an EIS or EA before a court.180 Such a justification entails 
proving that environmental impacts were sufficiently considered.181 
The litigation against APHIS in both Monsanto182 and Center for Food 
Safety v. Vilsack183 involved allegations that the agency did not adhere to 
NEPA requirements. The decisions show that APHIS has disregarded 
significant NEPA requirements when deregulating GM crops.184 Indeed, 
 
 174 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring all agencies, in their decision making, to take certain actions to ensure 
that environmental impacts are considered). 
 175 Id. § 4332(2)(C). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, 1508.13 (2011). The inquiry into whether an impact is significant includes 
determining the context, intensity, and public health effects of the proposed impact. See id. § 1508.27. But see 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2751 (2010) (noting that APHIS erred in issuing only 
an EA and should have issued an EIS before deregulating alfalfa). 
 179 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243–44 (1946) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
 180 See, e.g., Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751 (confirming that NEPA applies to APHIS actions). 
 181 See id. (noting that APHIS erred in issuing only an EA when additional environmental impacts should 
have been considered). 
 182 See id. (stating that plaintiffs’ complaint alleged violations of NEPA). 
 183 See No. C 10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010) (alleging that APHIS 
violated NEPA in its decision to issue permits without conducting any environmental review). 
 184 See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751 (noting APHIS’s failure to conduct sufficient environmental review 
under NEPA); Ctr. for Food Safety, 2010 WL 3835699, at *7 (“[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to 
succeed on the merits that APHIS unlawfully relied on a categorical exclusion to avoid conducting any 
environmental review.”). 
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despite a court order to consider GM sugar beets regulated pests until an EIS 
was completed, APHIS partially deregulated the strain before completing an 
EIS.185 The Monsanto and Center for Food Safety cases also demonstrate that 
courts are uncertain about the scope of NEPA protections and whether the 
environmental impacts that must be considered include economic impacts.186 
Further, the lack of significant judicial review after APHIS violated NEPA 
(where the courts either vacated an injunction against deregulation or allowed 
partial deregulation)187 may not deter APHIS from continuing to forego 
sufficient environmental assessments before deregulating modified crops.188 
5. Failures in the Current Regulatory System 
Gaps in the regulatory structure and incomplete implementation of existing 
policies pose substantial problems for the coexistence of organic and GM 
crops. The primary failure of the current system is its inability or refusal to 
sufficiently consider the impact of genetic drift before approving new GM 
crops.189 Although the FDA’s substantial-equivalence approach and the EPA’s 
narrow interpretation of FIFRA prevent either agency from playing a role in 
fostering coexistence, the primary hurdles for coexistence rest in APHIS’s 
deregulation procedures. This subsection discusses (1) APHIS’s failure to 
consider the potential contamination of non-GM crops, (2) pre-deregulation 
field-testing procedures that only require notification and general scientific 
explanations, (3) APHIS’s lack of oversight after deregulation, (4) APHIS’s 
current inability to consider the economic effects of contamination on organic 
programs, and (5) APHIS’s problems in implementing partial-deregulation 
conditions. This subsection concludes with a discussion of the StarLink corn 
deregulation as an example of insufficient regulatory oversight. 
First, “APHIS does not consider . . . the possible contamination that might 
result from pollen drift from GM plants to unmodified plants.”190 By not 
considering the potential contamination, APHIS is deregulating GM crops 
without considering a primary hurdle to coexistence efforts. Monsanto and 
 
 185 Pollack, supra note 30. 
 186 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751; Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 187 See infra Part III. 
 188 See Pollack, supra note 30 (noting that the USDA chose to deregulate GM sugar beets without 
completing an EIS). 
 189 See Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412 (discussing APHIS’s failure to account for potential 
contamination). 
 190 Id. 
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Center for Food Safety demonstrate that APHIS may have to revise this 
approach.191 To avoid a NEPA violation, APHIS should have to demonstrate 
that the environmental impact of genetic drift resulting from deregulation of 
the petitioned crop is not sufficiently adverse to warrant maintaining regulated 
status. However, after the decisions in both cases, APHIS deregulated the 
disputed crops.192 APHIS itself should have substantive requirements to 
consider the potential impacts of genetic drift on the economic feasibility of 
organic operations. As discussed, protecting the economic feasibility of 
organic operations promotes coexistence. APHIS is narrowly construing the 
Plant Protection Act when it does not sufficiently consider genetic drift. 
Second, APHIS only requires notifications before a GM producer 
commences field-testing of a new GM crop.193 The permissive approach may 
lead to contamination from crops that have not been addressed by the 
regulatory regime.194 While APHIS requires companies to complete a field test 
before granting deregulation, the tests need only “evaluate risks wholly by 
extrapolating from general, published scientific literature.”195 Producers only 
need to submit discussions of scientific literature after loose field-testing.196 
Under this approach, APHIS has allowed over ten thousand field tests and has 
deregulated over sixty GM crops since 1987.197 APHIS’s permissive testing 
procedures increase opportunities for contamination, thereby threatening 
organic operations and frustrating coexistence. 
Third, APHIS loses oversight capability once crops are fully deregulated,198 
and the lack of continuing oversight threatens coexistence aims. As discussed, 
excessive monocropping of GM crops can potentially lead to catastrophic 
effects.199 Additionally, a deregulated crop may cause more contamination than 
 
 191 See infra Part III. 
 192 Pollack, supra note 30. 
 193 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3(a), 340.3(d)(1) (2011). A GM producer can use the notification system as long as the 
new GM crop meets six standard requirements. Id. § 340.3(b); see also Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412–13. 
 194 In International Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns, organizations and individuals sued 
APHIS for allowing field tests (after only notification) for a GM-grass variety. 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13 
(D.D.C. 2007). The court held that APHIS had erred in allowing the field tests without first considering the 
environmental impacts under NEPA. Id. at 29–30. Because of the weaknesses with NEPA, this holding has not 
had a significant impact on testing procedures. 
 195 Bratspies, supra note 142, at 323. 
 196 See id. 
 197 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412–13. 
 198 Permits, Notifications, and Petitions, supra note 168. 
 199 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 124 (citing FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 9, at 47). 
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expected.200 Once a crop has been partially deregulated, APHIS’s primary 
strategy for controlling contamination is through containment measures.201 
Unfortunately, containment is rarely successful.202 The failure is either because 
planting-distance requirements are not adhered to203 or because the 
requirements themselves are insufficient.204 The USDA itself found in 2003 
that roughly 20% of farms growing modified crops did not comply with 
physical-planting requirements.205 To protect coexistence, APHIS must fulfill 
its monitoring responsibility over partially deregulated crops. Additionally, 
APHIS should be able to determine, after granting deregulation, that a 
modified crop takes too strong a toll on the underlying resources or disrupts 
neighboring farming practices too much and thus deserves to return to 
regulated status. 
Fourth, APHIS does not have an explicit avenue to consider the potential 
economic impacts of deregulation. While APHIS must consider the impact of 
contamination under NEPA, it does not consider the potential economic harm 
to adjacent non-GM farms.206 Without considering economic impacts on non-
GM farms resulting from deregulation, APHIS is not ensuring the continued 
feasibility of organic farms and is not fostering the goals of coexistence. The 
organic farmers in both Monsanto and Center for Food Safety incurred 
economic harm but were only successful in suits relating to NEPA 
violations.207 Although the Supreme Court, when discussing the standing 
challenges in Monsanto, concluded that economic harms do not disqualify a 
NEPA claim,208 the district court in Center for Food Safety specifically noted 
that it was unclear whether economic harms contribute to NEPA claims.209 
Organic programs should not have to resort to nebulous NEPA claims when an 
APHIS deregulation has threatened their economic rights. 
 
 200 See Bratspies, supra note 17, at 622. 
 201 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 414. 
 202 See Peck, supra note 66, at 43 (noting several potential sources of contamination). 
 203 Organic farmers are able to sue under regulatory causes of action when GM growers do not comply 
with substantive regulatory directives. See Mandel, supra note 95, at 97. This Comment argues that economic 
damage to organic farmers caused by GM growers acting within regulatory directives harms the goals of 
coexistence. 
 204 See Peck, supra note 66, at 43 (noting failures in containment measures). 
 205 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 414. 
 206 Id. at 412. 
 207 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2749 (2010); Ctr. for Food Safety v. 
Vilsack, No. C 10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *1, *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010). 
 208 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756. 
 209 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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Finally, APHIS has erred in not satisfying its explicit responsibilities under 
the Coordinated Framework. The USDA Office of Inspector General found in 
a 2005 audit that the USDA had failed significantly in several responsibilities, 
including the “failure to monitor whether GM crops were segregated, failure to 
test for contamination during and after field trials, [and] failure to comply with 
shipping requirements designed to prevent inadvertent dispersal of unapproved 
crops.”210 The report “concluded that APHIS ‘is relinquishing its regulatory 
responsibilities in favor of self-certification’ by GM[-crop] purveyors.”211 
APHIS’s inability to fulfill its own responsibilities further frustrates the goals 
of coexistence. 
The StarLink corn litigation highlights the potential repercussions of the 
insufficient regulatory system. StarLink corn was developed by Aventis as an 
herbicide- and pesticide-resistant strain of corn for use as animal feed.212 After 
obtaining nonregulated status from APHIS and registration for nonfood use 
from the EPA, Aventis began planting StarLink corn.213 The agencies imposed 
a buffer zone between areas where StarLink corn was planted and areas where 
nonmodified corn was planted, but the boundaries were ineffective.214 StarLink 
corn genes were discovered in a variety of food products, and the FDA recalled 
millions of dollars of corn because the StarLink genes had not been cleared for 
human consumption.215 StarLink genes were also discovered in exported corn, 
and Japan subsequently cut its corn imports from the United States nearly in 
half.216 The slash injured the organic interests selling to international markets. 
The resulting lawsuits cost Aventis a multimillion-dollar indemnity to sellers 
of consumer goods, settlement agreements with the attorneys general of 
seventeen states, and the defense of a multidistrict litigation of individual 
suits.217 Aventis was subject to millions of dollars in liability despite its 
regulatory clearance.218 The StarLink episode demonstrates that the regulatory 
 
 210 Bratspies, supra note 24, at 415 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT 
REPORT: ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED ORGANISM RELEASE PERMITS (2005) [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT], available at http://www.usda. 
gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf). 
 211 Id. at 416–17 (footnote omitted) (quoting AUDIT REPORT, supra note 210, at v–vi). 
 212 Bratspies, supra note 17, at 593, 598. 
 213 Id. at 617–18. 
 214 Id. at 622. 
 215 Id. at 623. 
 216 Id. Several other countries, including South Korea and Thailand, also canceled orders. Id. 
 217 Id. at 627. 
 218 See id. 
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failures at fostering coexistence can also impose substantial costs on GM 
producers. 
The StarLink corn incident emphasizes the overall weakness of the 
regulatory system. The FDA could control the spread of GM crops if it 
abandoned its substantial-equivalence principle and seriously considered the 
human health effects of modified food products. The EPA considers itself 
statutorily constrained to only consider pesticide-producing plants.219 NEPA 
forces agencies to consider environmental impacts, but its protection is limited 
by its inability to encompass economic harms and courts’ hesitation to provide 
sufficient remedies after violations. APHIS’s coverage of GM crops is 
similarly constrained by the substantial-equivalence principle. APHIS 
oversight is also lacking in that it does not fully appreciate the consequences of 
genetic drift, it allows permissive field-testing, it abrogates oversight after full 
deregulation, and it does not consider economic consequences of deregulated 
GM crops. 
The regulatory regime established by the Coordinated Framework was not 
designed to protect the interests of organic farming but rather to control and 
monitor the introduction of GM crops.220 To protect coexistence, the 
Coordinated Framework must ensure the economic feasibility of organic 
operations. Ideally, considering recent developments in agricultural research 
showing possible deleterious effects of mass GM-crop farming, the USDA and 
congressional goals of fostering coexistence, and the growing desire among 
American consumers for organically produced products, the regulatory 
structure should accommodate coexistence of organic and GM crops. 
III.  MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS AND CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY 
V. VILSACK 
Two recent cases demonstrate the current regulatory regime’s failure to 
protect the aims of coexistence. This part discusses (1) Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, where the Supreme Court struck down a broad 
injunction after APHIS improperly deregulated GM alfalfa,221 and (2) Center 
for Food Safety v. Vilsack, where a district court in California restrained itself 
 
 219 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 466–67 (arguing that the EPA could assert more authority under 
FIFRA). 
 220 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26, 
1986). 
 221 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761–62 (2010). 
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from issuing a broad injunction following the premature deregulation of GM 
sugar beets.222 These cases display current regulatory weaknesses and the 
failure of the courts to protect coexistence. 
A. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms began when APHIS granted a 
petition to deregulate modified alfalfa, and organizations of organic farmers 
brought suit challenging the decision.223 Although the organizations advanced 
several theories, the district court determined that APHIS erred in failing to 
comply with NEPA procedures.224 Specifically, the court held that APHIS was 
required to issue an EIS prior to granting deregulation and that the 
determination of no significant impact under a preliminary EA was 
insufficient.225 The EA was insufficient in part because APHIS did not 
consider the extent of gene transmission from engineered alfalfa to organic 
alfalfa.226 The court noted that gene transmission could tarnish the organic 
quality of organic crops.227 The district court proceeded to the remedy phase 
and allowed Monsanto to intervene.228 
The court requested proposals on the appropriate remedy.229 APHIS and 
Monsanto submitted a proposed judgment whereby the court would require 
APHIS to complete an EIS but continue to allow the planting of GM alfalfa in 
specific regions.230 APHIS contended that modified alfalfa could be planted 
with several restrictions, including an isolation distance to protect from gene 
flow; tailored cleaning, handling, identification, and harvesting practices; and a 
requirement that all GM-alfalfa farmers have contracts with Monsanto that 
comply with the restrictions.231 The district court declined to adopt the 
proposed judgment.232 
 
 222 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 223 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2743, 2750. 
 224 Id. at 2751. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755; see also Redick & Endres, supra note 122, at 25 (reviewing the 
Monsanto litigation before the lower courts). 
 228 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
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The court instead fashioned its own injunction imposing a near blanket ban 
on all GM-alfalfa planting.233 In determining the scope of the injunction, the 
court noted the technical difficulty in trying to “fine-tune a particular remedy” 
and concluded that a simpler remedy is more attractive “from the Court’s point 
of view.”234 The court allowed farmers who had already purchased modified 
alfalfa seeds to plant their crops until a certain date.235 Later, the court issued a 
permanent injunction vacating the deregulation, requiring APHIS to issue an 
EIS before deregulating, enjoining all planting until the completion of the 
EIS,236 and imposing other handling and identification restrictions.237 The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction after APHIS and Monsanto appealed its 
scope.238 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the challengers to the 
deregulation had been forced to pursue the case as a NEPA violation.239 The 
Court held that the organic organizations had standing because they had 
demonstrated environmental harm through the NEPA violation and that the 
presence of additional economic harm did not remove that standing.240 
However, the Court ultimately rejected the injunction because the plaintiffs 
failed to satisfy the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief.241 The 
Court’s decision rested primarily on the plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate that 
they would suffer irreparable injury from the proposed remedy allowing partial 
deregulation.242 
 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 2760 n.6. 
 235 Id. at 2751. 
 236 Id. In December 2009, APHIS did complete an EIS and concluded that complete deregulation will not 
interfere with organic-alfalfa farmers and that the two “could co-exist peacefully.” See Supreme Court Rules 
Ban on Deregulation of Genetically Modified Crops Was Too Broad, 78 U.S.L.W. 1839 (June 22, 2010). 
 237 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751–52. 
 238 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 239 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750–51. 
 240 Id. at 2756. 
 241 Id. at 2756–59. The four-factor test for obtaining permanent injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate the following: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 
Id. at 2756 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
 242 Id. at 2759–60. 
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This rebuke of the district-court-fashioned injunction demonstrates courts’ 
difficulties in their efforts to adhere to coexistence goals. The lower court 
could not comprehend the technical aspects of the issue. APHIS, Monsanto, 
and the organic interests had all submitted evidence supporting or refuting the 
appropriateness of allowing partial deregulation.243 The district judge noted the 
difficulties in establishing the requisite facts to determine the extent of the 
injunction and acknowledged that a blanket ban may be overreaching.244 But 
the judge nevertheless imposed a broad injunction. 
Based on the language used in Monsanto, district courts will now be very 
hesitant to issue broad injunctions when APHIS has failed to consider the 
implications of a deregulation decision.245 APHIS ultimately concluded to 
deregulate GM alfalfa in January 2011, and organic interests announced their 
intention to challenge the deregulation.246 The inability of courts to understand 
scientific issues and provide a sufficient remedy, as the district court was 
unable to do in Monsanto, illustrates the inability of courts to support 
coexistence goals. 
B. Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack 
Shortly after the Monsanto decision, organic-farming associations and a 
Washington organization against biotech products sought vacation of an 
APHIS decision deregulating GM sugar beets.247 APHIS had permitted the 
planting of GM sugar beets after Monsanto petitioned for deregulation.248 The 
organizations brought suit claiming that APHIS erred in failing to conduct an 
EIS before allowing deregulation.249 While the district court vacated the 
deregulation, it noted that Monsanto counseled against issuing an injunction 
and chose to not enjoin planting, at least in part because planting for the season 
was already completed.250 The district court also noted, when discussing the 
 
 243 Id. at 2758. 
 244 See id. at 2760 n.6. 
 245 See id. at 2760–61 (“[T]he courts have no cause to intervene. Indeed, the broad injunction entered here 
essentially pre-empts the very procedure by which the agency could determine, independently of the pending 
EIS process for assessing the effects of a complete deregulation, that a limited deregulation would not pose any 
appreciable risk of environmental harm.”). 
 246 Pollack, supra note 29. 
 247 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 10-04038 JSW, 2010 WL 3835699, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 
2010). 
 248 Id. at *1, *6. 
 249 Id. at *1. 
 250 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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NEPA violation, that “it is not clear that economic consequences is a factor the 
Court may consider in environmental cases.”251 This statement evidences the 
need to clarify the regulatory options protecting the economic interests of 
organic farm programs. 
While the district judge did not fully enjoin the planting of distributed 
sugar beets, he emphasized that the vacatur returned GM sugar beets to 
regulated status under the Plant Protection Act.252 The decision thus required 
APHIS to issue an EIS before deregulating GM sugar beets.253 However, the 
USDA announced in February 2011 that it would deregulate sugar beets for the 
upcoming season without completing an EIS, which it did not complete until 
June 1, 2012.254 APHIS’s choice to defy the court illustrates the weak role that 
courts play in fostering coexistence. 
These cases demonstrate that APHIS and the courts are unable to protect 
the economic interests of organic operations from the potential harms of GM 
crops. The cases also demonstrate that organic programs have limited and 
incomplete avenues for relief once they have been harmed by APHIS or nearby 
GM crops. The limited relief deters farmers from adopting organic practices. 
APHIS is unable to foster the goals of coexistence because its deregulation 
decisions do not capture the economic interests of organic farmers. Legal and 
regulatory reform is required to adequately foster coexistence in the United 
States. 
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
To adequately foster coexistence, the legal and regulatory structures must 
be able to control contamination. Possible solutions to the current inability to 
control contamination include unilateral agency reform and statutory reform. 
The agencies with authority under the Coordinated Framework can change 
their policies to enhance protections toward organic-farming interests and, 
therefore, coexistence efforts. While the EPA and FDA can implement changes 
to advance coexistence efforts, APHIS can effect the most change. APHIS can 
 
 251 Id. at 953. 
 252 Id. at 955. 
 253 See id. at 950, 955. 
 254 Pollack, supra note 30; USDA Announces Final Environmental Impact Statement and Plant Pest Risk 
Assessment for Genetically Engineered Sugar Beets, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH 
INSPECTION SERVICE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/06/sugar_beets.shtml (last visited Aug. 6, 
2012). 
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(1) give more weight to the genetic-drift impact on organic farming when 
considering deregulation under the Plant Protection Act, (2) discontinue its 
permissive field-testing practices and demand specific scientific evidence 
before granting deregulations, and (3) ensure that its boundary impositions are 
adhered to. However, limitations on agencies’ abilities to change policies 
within their statutory directives may prevent the agencies from fully 
accounting for contamination problems. Coexistence will be best served by 
statutory reform (1) requiring APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA to abandon or 
temper the substantial-equivalence doctrine and consider economic impacts on 
organic-farming interests when reviewing deregulation petitions and (2) 
granting adjudicatory power to APHIS.255 This Part discusses agency reform 
and statutory reform, respectively, as avenues to advance the aims of 
coexistence. 
A. New Course from Within APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA 
Generally, APHIS, the FDA, and the EPA could change their 
interpretations of their governing statutes and earn judicial deference for their 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes.256 However, there can be limitations on 
agencies’ abilities to modify their interpretations of statutes or modify their 
practices. When agencies change positions, they must account for reliance 
interests.257 Such reliance interests might not be as strong when an agency 
reinterprets a statute but may pose difficulties when the agency changes 
positions from guidance documents or regular practice.258 Similarly, APHIS, 
the EPA, and the FDA will be constrained by their long adherence to the 
equivalence principles in the Coordinated Framework.259 
 
 255 This proposed solution is offered within the confines of the Coordinated Framework. A more thorough 
overhaul of agency responsibility may be more effective. See Mandel, supra note 141, at 2249–50 (proposing, 
for regulating GM crops, to scrap the Coordinated Framework’s existing allocations and spread power to 
agencies under more direct mandates). This Comment argues that coexistence can be advanced when the 
current framework accounts for the economic interests of organic farming. 
 256 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 863–64 (1984) 
(extending controlling weight to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes and noting that agencies can 
change such interpretations). 
 257 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (noting that changes in position 
do not require more justification but that more detail may be required when the agency’s “prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account”). 
 258 Compare id. (noting a possible requirement for increased justification of an agency’s change in relied-
upon policy), with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting that agencies must have space to change statutory 
interpretations under a new administration). 
 259 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,306 (June 26, 
1986). 
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The nation’s coexistence interests can be protected if APHIS takes steps to 
revise its interpretation of the Plant Protection Act. Similarly, if the FDA and 
the EPA revise their interpretations of the FDCA and FIFRA, respectively, 
then the agencies would be better able to protect the interests of organic 
farming and, therefore, the aims of coexistence. This subsection analyzes (1) 
changes within the FDA and the EPA, (2) changes in APHIS’s interpretation of 
the Plant Protection Act, and (3) policy changes within APHIS relating to the 
deregulation of GM crops. 
1. EPA and FDA: Interpretive Changes of FIFRA and the FDCA 
As discussed, there may be valid reasons for directing the FDA to 
reconsider its substantial-equivalence approach to GM-food products. If the 
FDA were to abandon the substantial-equivalence principle and begin strictly 
assessing the safety of GM products, the resulting changes in approval and 
labeling may decrease the demand for GM food and increase the demand for 
organic food. The FDA’s statutory mandate does not require it to adhere to the 
substantial-equivalence principle.260 While an FDA change may not directly 
foster coexistence, limitations on the approval of GM crops may reduce 
instances of contamination. 
The EPA’s regulatory authority under FIFRA is not directly contrary to the 
interests of organic farming. The EPA’s statutory mandate could allow the 
EPA to impose stricter standards when permitting GM crops.261 Organic 
interests could benefit from a reinterpretation of FIFRA whereby the EPA 
revokes its minimum tolerance levels and more strictly reviews GM crops and 
their ultimate impact on pesticide levels.262 However, such a reinterpretation is 
not necessarily conducive to promoting the goals of coexistence. The agency 
that can effect the most significant change toward coexistence is APHIS. 
2. APHIS Interpretive Changes of the Plant Protection Act 
APHIS could announce its intention to consider new deregulation petitions 
on the basis of gene-flow effects on organic crops. The Plant Protection Act 
 
 260 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006)) (laying out FDA responsibilities under the FDCA and not mentioning any 
required analysis). The FDA’s interpretation withstood an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge. Alliance for Bio-
Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 261 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 466–67 (arguing that the EPA could assert more power over GM 
crops through FIFRA). 
 262 See id. 
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largely leaves the ability to APHIS to determine what a pest is; it only requires 
the agency to obey sound science.263 APHIS could announce its intention to 
consider new petitions for deregulation of modified crops as pests under a 
standard naming any pest as an organism capable of contamination causing a 
certain level of economic harm to farms within a certain distance.264 This 
change would force APHIS to consider ongoing marketability of non-GM 
crops and potential liabilities for patent infringement. Although this approach 
would not allow APHIS to fully consider economic impacts on organic crops, 
it would implicitly encompass the economic interests by protecting more 
organic crops from genetic drift. If APHIS were able to overcome the 
administrative hurdles and begin to reinterpret the Plant Protection Act to 
provide more protection to organic crops, coexistence efforts would be better 
served. This approach would be difficult because the current statute says 
nothing about economic interests and because the approach would entail a 
divergence from the long-followed equivalence principles in the Coordinated 
Framework.265 
3. Policy Changes Within APHIS and the USDA 
APHIS could also take less drastic approaches, without reinterpreting the 
Plant Protection Act, to better account for the interests of organic operations 
and, therefore, coexistence. The agency could change its permissive field-
testing procedures and begin engaging in environmental studies before 
allowing tests that could lead to harmful gene flow.266 International Center for 
Technology Assessment v. Johanns suggests that APHIS may soon be required 
to conduct assessments before permitting field-testing.267 If APHIS restrains 
 
 263 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7702, 7711; 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2011). 
 264 The Plant Protection Act states: 
[N]o person shall import, enter, export, or move in interstate commerce any plant pest, unless the 
importation, entry, exportation, or movement is authorized under general or specific permit and is 
in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may issue to prevent the introduction of 
plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States. 
7 U.S.C. § 7711(a). Clearly, the congressional grant of power can be considered an express grant providing a 
great deal of deference to USDA interpretations. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). The Chevron decision even noted that agencies should be encouraged to change 
their interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Id. at 865. 
 265 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–43 (1983) 
(articulating the standard for review of agency decisions pursuant to statutes). 
 266 Cf. Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412 (explaining that, under the current regime, APHIS typically does 
not require permits for field-testing). 
 267 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 30 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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field-testing, organic crops will not be exposed to gene flow from modified 
crops before the crops are deregulated. Similarly, APHIS could begin to 
require more stringent scientific evidence that potentially deregulated crops 
will not harm the environment, as opposed to the general evidence it currently 
requires.268 This more stringent standard could prevent the contamination 
problems seen in Monsanto. 
Finally, the USDA as a whole could upgrade its monitoring of boundary 
limitations imposed on GM crops. Even if APHIS takes into account the 
interests of organic farmers, if the planters of GM crops do not adhere to the 
ensuing boundary limitations,269 organic operations may still lose their harvest 
to GM-crop drift. If the USDA is not ensuring compliance with boundary 
limitations, GM farmers have no incentive to constrain the planting of 
modified crops, and organic farms will continue to be injured. The USDA 
could foster coexistence by enforcing existing programs without changing 
policy. 
There are several limitations in unilateral agency efforts to foster 
coexistence. APHIS may not be able to adequately encompass economic 
interests in its determinations of what is a plant pest under the current statute. 
APHIS may not be able to review existing deregulations without additional 
statutory mandates.270 Further, any agency action may be constrained by 
existing reliance interests.271 APHIS, the EPA, and the FDA have followed the 
Coordinated Framework since 1986. Additionally, agency-initiated change will 
not be able to overcome the problem of general courts deciding who gets to 
farm.272 
Without substantive changes to the underlying statutes, specifically the 
Plant Protection Act, the regulatory system is unable to adequately foster the 
goals of coexistence. Generally, the possible administrative changes would be 
 
 268 See Bratspies, supra note 24, at 412 (noting APHIS’s current practice of allowing general scientific 
extrapolations). 
 269 See id. at 414 (discussing the USDA’s failure to ensure compliance with physical-planting 
requirements). 
 270 See Bratspies, supra note 142, at 325–26 (noting that the USDA does not retain control over 
deregulated crops). 
 271 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (noting that an agency may 
require a heightened justification to change a relied-upon policy). 
 272 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11 (lamenting that the current wealth of 
litigation relating to contamination is leading judges to decide who gets to farm). 
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helpful to coexistence but not as effective as the implementation of statutory 
revisions. 
B. Statutory Reform 
Congress can revise the governing statutes to force the agencies under the 
Coordinated Framework to protect the feasibility of organic crops and, 
therefore, foster coexistence. Congress should (1) revise the Plant Protection 
Act to change the inquiry undertaken by APHIS when reviewing deregulation 
petitions by abandoning the substantial-equivalence principle and considering 
economic impacts caused by genetic drift, (2) direct APHIS to retain oversight 
after deregulation and monitor scientific developments on the impacts of 
deregulated crops, and (3) add a mandatory adjudicative arm to APHIS. The 
proposed revisions should also require APHIS to change field-testing and 
monitoring procedures, as discussed in the previous section. This section 
analyzes the proposed changes and implements them using the facts in 
Monsanto. This section also discusses the feasibility and costs of the proposed 
revisions. 
1. Revising the Plant Protection Act to Account for Economic Impacts 
Congress should direct APHIS to abandon the substantial-equivalence 
principle and begin exploring the economic impacts of deregulation on 
organic-farming programs. Although organic-farming interests and the U.S. 
agricultural system as a whole would benefit from changes in labeling and 
permitting procedures from the FDA and the EPA,273 Congress does not need 
to revamp the FDA or the EPA to protect organic-farming interests 
sufficiently. However, revising the Plant Protection Act to impose a 
requirement on APHIS to temper the equivalence principle and consider the 
economic feasibility of organic crops when considering deregulation will 
significantly enhance coexistence efforts. 
The necessary revisions should prevent APHIS from continuing to grant 
permits permissively for the release of GM crops without fully considering the 
economic interests of organic farming.274 The revised statute must include 
language requiring APHIS to consider and protect the economic interests of 
 
 273 See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 103, at 403–05, 414–16 (discussing the failures in the current labeling 
system). 
 274 Agencies are constrained to follow their statutory directives, to withstand judicial review. See Motor 
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–44 (1983). 
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organic farming.275 These interests, as discussed, benefit U.S. agriculture 
generally and are not necessarily exclusive of GM planting.276 The revision 
should maintain the presumption that GM crops should not be introduced until 
permitted by APHIS and should further require that deregulation involves a 
searching review of contamination and its potential economic impact on 
organic crops.277 APHIS’s eventual deregulation decisions will be subject to an 
exacting statutory standard protecting organic economic interests.278 Congress 
should ensure that statutory revisions prohibit continued permissive field-
testing, which exposes organic farms to contamination from crops that have 
not been adequately analyzed. 
While Congress does not need to modify the current organic-labeling 
system,279 Congress should ensure that APHIS deregulation procedures 
recognize that organic-farming interests may adopt stricter definitions of 
organic than the USDA definition. Many organic operations sell to the 
European community, which imposes stricter standards than the USDA 
promulgates domestically.280 Similarly, many organic organizations require 
their own standards in addition to USDA standards.281 Therefore, APHIS 
should defer to organic farmers’ reasonable determinations of organic status. 
2. Revising the Plant Protection Act to Require Continuing Oversight After 
Deregulation 
Congress should also modify the Plant Protection Act to include a mandate 
for APHIS to monitor technological and scientific developments within the 
 
 275 Supreme Court precedent requires agencies to provide a rational explanation for a decision that relates 
the found facts to the statutory requirements. Id. 
 276 See Endres, supra note 62, at 117 (noting the benefits of GM and non-GM crops growing 
simultaneously). 
 277 As discussed in Part II.B, supra, organic farmers cannot necessarily recover for economic loss under 
tort-recovery theories. See Redick & Endres, supra note 122, at 27. This Comment argues that sufficient 
economic protection can only be attained at the federal regulatory level. 
 278 The heightened standard, hard look review, requires agencies to provide a rational explanation for a 
decision that relates the found facts to the statutory requirements. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–44. 
 279 See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXI, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 (2006)) (imposing national standards on the production, handling, and 
labeling of organic foods). 
 280 See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Anticipatory Nuisance and the Prevention of Environmental Harm and 
Economic Loss from GMOs in the United States, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 107, 145 (2008) (noting European 
organic standards). 
 281 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010) (discussing organic farmers’ 
affidavits wherein farmers described steps taken to continue marketing non-GM alfalfa to their consumers). 
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GM-crop arena.282 Congress can align this mandate with existing programs 
aimed at sustainability and conservation.283 As noted, there are potential risks 
associated with extensive monocropping and the repeated planting of GM 
crops leading to potentially deleterious effects on overall agricultural health.284 
With a focus on monitoring developments, APHIS will be obligated to 
recognize new scientific studies that quantify the risks of new and existing GM 
crops. While the USDA has been unsuccessful at implementing prior 
conservation and sustainability programs,285 a focus on deregulated GM crops’ 
subsequent environmental impact may make such programs more effective. 
Parties should be able to submit data to the agency on scientific developments. 
APHIS will be obliged to acknowledge the data, and when data shows that a 
deregulated crop exacts too hard a cost on the environment or neighboring 
farms, APHIS should return the crop to regulated status. 
3. Creating an Adjudicative Arm Within APHIS 
Congress should also direct APHIS to create an adjudicatory arm capable 
of deciding disputes between GM and non-GM crop farms.286 An adjudicatory 
arm will prevent the confused remedies entered by general courts, such as the 
injunction issued by the district court in Monsanto.287 Similarly, an 
adjudicatory arm could utilize agency expertise and experience in hearing 
patent and tort suits, saving parties the cost of educating a general court. An 
educated adjudicative arm within APHIS could help promote the coexistence 
policies that the USDA advocates for agricultural health.288 The arm will 
 
 282 See Mandel, supra note 141, at 2247–48 (noting that APHIS should have the capability of postmarket 
monitoring). 
 283 See David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture: Towards a 
Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37–38 (2002) (noting that 
the USDA has not implemented prior sustainability programs). 
 284 See Aoki, supra note 9, at 124 (“Genetic engineering in the context of commercial crops necessarily 
entails decreased genetic diversity. Because it is essential that GE crops have a uniform genetic structure, 
genetic engineering encourages monoculture.”). 
 285 See Adelman & Barton, supra note 283, at 37–38. 
 286 The Administrative Procedure Act allows agencies to adjudicate disputes relating to an administrative 
program. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(a) (2006). Currently, the Plant Protection Act provides federal courts with 
jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 7736(a). 
 287 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 n.6 (2010) (quoting the district 
court’s decision, which noted both that it was difficult to “fine-tune a particular remedy” and that “the simpler 
the remedy, the more attractive it is from the Court’s point of view”). 
 288 See Letter from Thomas Vilsack to Stakeholders, supra note 11 (contending that the USDA wants to 
foster coexistence). 
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prevent “the courts [from] deciding who gets to farm their way and who will 
be prevented from doing so,” as the Secretary of Agriculture fears.289 
While ideally statutory reform will reduce contamination, it is unlikely that 
such determinations will preclude disputes between GM farms and organic 
farms. The adjudicative arm should be vested with power to decide factual 
disputes between parties—for instance, whether each party is adhering to 
distance requirements imposed by a partial deregulation of GM crops.290 The 
adjudicatory arm will also be in an excellent position to hear patent disputes291 
stemming from gene flow.292 Disputes involving GM crops are fraught with 
scientific and technical information.293 The district court dealing with the 
dispute in Monsanto specifically noted its difficulty in discerning the science 
involved in genetic-drift disputes,294 and the ensuing broad injunction earned 
heavy criticism from the Supreme Court.295 Remedies often involve discerning 
adequate boundary distances and outlining handling and shipping 
restrictions.296 Therefore, adjudicatory outcomes will benefit from a forum that 
is able to draw on accrued agency expertise, a common justification for agency 
adjudication.297 Indeed, in both the deregulation and adjudicative arenas, 
organic and GM interests will benefit from agency expertise.298 Additionally, 
the adjudicative arm can serve as a venue for organic- and modified-crop 
 
 289 See id. 
 290 The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to vest Article I courts with decision-making power 
traditionally left to Article III courts when the decision making is part of and necessary to a broad program, 
such as efforts to promote coexistence. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 
(1986) (allowing adjudication as part of the commodity futures trading program and noting that the Court’s 
“prior precedents . . . have not intimated that principles of federalism impose limits on Congress’ ability to 
delegate adjudicated functions to non-Article III tribunals”). 
 291 The agency expertise in this area should not be on the validity of patents, traditionally left to the patent 
specialty agencies. See Aoki, supra note 9, at 102 (noting the role of specialized patent courts). 
 292 See Bernhardt, supra note 67, at 24 (noting the wealth of patent infringement cases filed by GM 
producers). 
 293 Some commentators question the current level of scientific expertise possessed by APHIS. See 
Mandel, supra note 141, at 2248–49. Such criticisms are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 294 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 n.6 (2010). 
 295 See id. at 2758. 
 296 See, e.g., id. at 2751–52 (noting that the lower court imposed handling requirements for extant GM 
alfalfa as part of the injunction). 
 297 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 915, 935 (1988) (“The first important interest supporting congressional flexibility to employ non-
article III adjudicators is the interest in making the best use of expertise to implement a substantive regulatory 
agenda.”). 
 298 See Endres, supra note 106, at 233 (noting that technically competent licensing committees could 
guide coexistence efforts). 
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interests to petition for a change in classification pending the discovery of 
additional information.299 
4. Genetically Modified Alfalfa Under a Revised Regime 
The situation in Monsanto is illustrative of the potential efficacy of a 
revised statutory scheme in promoting coexistence. The dispute began when 
APHIS granted a permit to Monsanto allowing it to plant GM alfalfa.300 
Organic programs argued that subsequent GM-alfalfa planting would lead to 
contamination causing several organic farms to lose organic status.301 The 
organic programs brought suit against APHIS alleging failures in its 
determination that the modified alfalfa could be fully deregulated.302 Their 
allegations against the agency involved a hodgepodge of inadequacies, 
including a violation of NEPA.303 Because the district court adopted the 
NEPA-violation angle,304 APHIS’s violation of NEPA was reviewed at the 
higher levels, including at the Supreme Court.305 Organic interests struggled to 
establish their case, especially in terms of economic harm, because of the lack 
of avenues available to protect their economic interests. While a later case 
discussed the ambiguity regarding whether NEPA violations should include an 
analysis of economic harm,306 organic operations should not need to utilize 
roundabout methods to protect their interests. With a more concrete avenue for 
protecting organic interests, the dispute in Monsanto would have taken a 
different form. 
Had a revised Plant Protection Act been in effect during the deregulation 
process, APHIS would have been forced to consider the economic impacts of 
genetic drift. In Monsanto, the district court specifically noted that APHIS 
insufficiently considered the scientific aspects of genetic drift,307 whereas 
under the new regime, APHIS would have to consider the scientific genetic 
 
 299 Congress should mandate an agency response to such petitions so as to avoid deference to agency 
inaction. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (expressing strong deference to an agency’s 
determination of whether an action should be taken). 
 300 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751. 
 301 Id. at 2754. The organic farmers complained that their crops could not meet their organization’s 
definition of organic food, independent of the USDA’s definition. Id. at 2755. 
 302 Id. at 2750–51. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. at 2751 (discussing the district court’s determinations). 
 305 Id. at 2756–57. 
 306 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“[I]t is not clear that 
economic consequences is a factor the Court may consider in environmental cases.”). 
 307 Monsanto , 130 S. Ct. at 2751. 
KIEFER GALLEYS4 8/20/2012  8:13 AM 
1282 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1241 
drift and its economic impact, and also explain it in a manner sufficient to 
withstand strict hard look judicial review.308 
It is of course unclear whether a revision would lead to a different outcome 
regarding the deregulation of modified alfalfa.309 Organic interests could only 
be sure that their economic interests be taken into consideration. Presumably, 
any deregulation decision with sufficiently high stakes will face pre-
enforcement review soon after promulgation.310 However, those challenging a 
promulgated rule under hard look review have a much more straightforward 
opportunity to challenge the promulgated rule than arguing for a NEPA 
violation. Under hard look review, APHIS would have to explain its choice in 
the face of the statutory mandates; here, assuming deregulation, APHIS would 
have to explain how scientific and economic data was considered and why it 
chose to deregulate in the face of such information.311 This alone is a much 
more pleasing result for the coexistence of organic and GM crops. 
Assuming, under the Monsanto facts, that APHIS chose to deregulate 
modified alfalfa, organic operations contaminated by genetic drift could bring 
a claim, within the proposed APHIS adjudication, against planters of GM 
alfalfa. The agency would then be required to broker the dispute and issue the 
appropriate remedy. The adjudication would benefit from the accrued expertise 
of the agency, which allows it to understand the science involved in the drift 
calculations and determine the appropriate remedy (if any) with a precision 
unavailable to judges in general courts. The parties can also expect reduced 
litigation costs before agency adjudication, which will not require educating 
the forum and may utilize streamlined procedures. Similarly, if Monsanto 
obtained deregulation of a crop and then suspected farmers of breaching 
licensing agreements or infringing patents, it could bring its claims before the 
agency tribunal. Additionally, if subsequent research reveals that GM alfalfa is 
 
 308 Hard look review requires agencies to provide a rational explanation for a decision that relates the 
found facts to the statutory requirements. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 309 APHIS has now fully deregulated alfalfa. Pollack, supra note 29. This determination underscores the 
need for additional protection for organic crops outside the environmental context. 
 310 See JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING, AND DEFENDING 
FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS § 13:1, at 295 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that challenges to regulations begin 
immediately after they are published); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967) 
(allowing pre-enforcement review and paving the way for consistent pre-enforcement review in administrative 
rulemaking). 
 311 Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52. Those challenging the decision will have to identify specific comments 
or accepted scientific information that APHIS was aware of but did not adequately address. See id. 
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more harmful than was understood at deregulation, non-GM interests could 
petition to return the strain to regulated status. Unlike the deregulation of GM 
alfalfa under the current regime, the process leading to the potential 
deregulation of modified alfalfa under the proposed regime would capture and 
consider the economic impacts of contamination and foster coexistence. 
The foregoing discussion assumes that APHIS will faithfully fulfill its 
responsibilities, but history has shown that APHIS will not always do so. 
Unless statutory reform leads to renewed vigor within the agency, the 
prospects of successful reform are weak. Most likely, any change will continue 
to face agency capture and agency inertia, limiting the impact of the change. 
5. The Feasibility and Costs of Statutory Reform 
Despite the potential efficacy of a revised statute, the current legislative 
environment may not support legislative revisions. The organic-food/modified-
food debate does not seem to be an issue of national importance during the 
economic downturn. Similarly, despite growing international demand for 
organic food, its domestic demand is probably not sufficiently high to spur 
Congress to action.312 Additionally, the large agricultural companies that 
advocate the deregulation of GM crops under the current system have 
embedded influence within the federal government.313 Overall, until the 
national consensus more heavily favors organic foods, it is unlikely that 
Congress will revise the current legal structure. 
Legislation protecting diverse farming interests is not without precedent in 
the United States. The New Deal Era and subsequent years saw enormous 
growth in legislation protecting farming interests. These programs ranged from 
guaranteed government loans,314 to crop loss protection,315 to controlling prices 
 
 312 See Martin, supra, note 53 (noting the growth of the organic-food market but identifying its small 
size). 
 313 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 476 (discussing the agribusiness industry and “its allies in the [Bush] 
Administration and Congress”). 
 314 Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (restricting production to boost prices during 
the New Deal), invalidated by U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see also Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1281–1407 (2006)) (replacing the 1933 Act, 
which was held unconstitutional, with a system of price supports). 
 315 Bankhead–Jones Farm Tenant Act, ch. 517, 50 Stat. 522 (1937) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7 U.S.C.) (creating the eventual Farm Security Administration, which ultimately worked to protect 
small, impoverished farmers). 
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and crop yield.316 The success of these programs was responsible for decades 
of security and stability in American farming.317 Given this previous success, it 
may not be too radical to hope for an overhaul of the regulatory framework 
within the next few congressional sessions. 
Both of these potential solutions, the agency-centered changes and the 
statutory changes, would impose costs on GM-crop producers. The statutory 
reform would also cost taxpayer money. GM producers would be forced to 
change development in research plans if APHIS adopts changes in its 
deregulation procedures. The companies would need to spend more money on 
field-testing procedures to explore contamination more thoroughly, and on 
research to justify deregulation, instead of just extrapolating from general 
research. The producers may also lose investments on developed products that 
would no longer meet APHIS standards. Taxpayers would largely foot the bill 
for an expanded adjudicatory arm that would necessarily entail an increase in 
staff and other outlays. However, as discussed, the adjudicatory arm would 
save money for both organic- and GM-farming interests. Overall, the 
additional costs would not outweigh the benefits of successfully fostering 
coexistence. 
CONCLUSION 
The USDA goal for the coexistence of organic and GM crops is 
unattainable under the current regulatory system. The Coordinated Framework, 
a patchwork of agency responsibility, is unable to control effectively the 
introduction of GM crops into U.S. agriculture. This failure leads to 
uncontrolled contamination, which injures the interests of both organic 
operations and modified-crop producers. Recent cases have drawn attention to 
the weaknesses in the current system and have underscored the need for a 
solution to the weaknesses. 
The USDA and Congress have both stated their desire to foster the 
coexistence of GM and organic programs. Recent evidence shows that large-
 
 316 See, e.g., Bankhead–Jones Farm Tenant Act, 50 Stat. 522 (creating the eventual Farm Security 
Administration, which provided government loans and crop-loss protection); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 
Stat. at 32 (controlling crop yield and price). 
 317 See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a 
Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 624 (2010) (“[T]he policies in the original 
legislation continued to serve as the backbone of U.S. agricultural policy long after the farming crisis of the 
Great Depression was averted.”). 
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scale planting of GM crops has potential deleterious effects on agricultural 
health. Organic farms do not pose the same risks. However, organic crops are 
unable to offer some of the benefits associated with GM crops. The agricultural 
health of the United States requires beneficial coexistence of GM and organic 
crops. 
The ideal solution to the current inability to foster coexistence involves 
statutory revisions (1) requiring APHIS to consider the economic implications 
of genetic drift when deregulating and (2) creating an adjudicative arm within 
APHIS. These revisions would ensure the economic feasibility of organic 
programs and thus encourage coexistence. However, such a revision may be 
unlikely in the current legislative environment. If such a modification is 
unfeasible, the USDA, the EPA, or the FDA could change their approaches to 
deregulating GM crops to limit the harmful effects of genetic drift. Such 
modifications may temper the harmful effects of contamination and enhance 
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